Abstract-Programming efficient and reliable code can be considered a non-trivial task, as it requires deep understanding of tbe problem to be solved along witb good programming skills. However, software frameworks and programming paradigms can provide a dependable infrastructure upon wbicb better programs can be written and deployed. This allows engineers to focus mainly on their task, while relying on the underlying run-time environment for taking care of low-level programming issues, such as memory allocation and disposal, typing consistency and interface compliance. In this paper, we argue that strong-typed programming languages and paradigms offer a valid support for the production of reliable programs. Aware of the challenges of formal measurement metrics for code quality, we present the benefits of strong-typing by Considering a practical application: The design and implementation of RoboX, a tour-guide robot for tbe Swiss National Exbibition Exp0.02. The example is extremely well suited for such a dlscussion, since complex mechatronic applications can be considered critical system8-i.e. systems whose failure may endanger missions, lives and society-thus their reliability has to be made a prime concern.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the pioneering era of calculating machines, computers were programmed using primitives, which were able to directly instruct the underlying processor architecture. These instructions were either coded as sequences of digits-the machine language-x, more conveniently, in a buman-readable version-the assembly languagewhicb would be translated to machine language by a so-called assembler. Machine and assembly language are sometimes referred to as the first two generations of programming languages.
In the sixties developers began to realize that programs written in assembly language were tedious to write, the produced code was tied to a particular processor architand their engineering was extremely error-prone, as the semantic gap2 was too large
The third generation of languages represented the dawn of the high-level languages. They contributed to the reduction of the semantic gap by taking c-through compilers and interpreters-of the mapping between language constructs and the underlying instruction set
The past thuty years witnessed many new languages and paradigms, such as imperafive or procedural Ianguager (e.g. C,
1. The title quotes, nearly vnbatim, Bob Dylan's "Forever Young" (Columbia, 1974) . Likewise, it shall be taken as a wish and, umcwrently, as a recommeodation. 2.The difference between the complex o p t i o n s performed by high-level language comlructs and the simple ones provided by computer insrmction sen. It was in an attempt to hy to close this gap that camputer architects designed increasingly complex insmction set computers.
rive@inf.ethz.ch roland.siegwart@epfl.ch Oberon), logical (e.g. Prolog),fincfianal (e.g. ML) and objecforienfed (e.g. C+t, Java, Eiffel, Oberon-2). The new paradigms also introduced new features such as the strong-typing. Examples of strong-typed programming languages can be found in the Ada, Java and Oberon programming languages. C
and C H are sometimes described as strongly typed, they are indeed weakly typed. The need for a safe type system in programming languages was a logical consequence derived &om a set of requirements, coming fiom developers looking for rapid development-time and ease of maintenance, without having to pay to incur in performance penalties. A milestone achievement for the definition of the notion of type may be identified in the work of Cardelli and Wegner [7] .
They argue that types, much akin to mathematics fomulle, impose constraints which help to enforce correctness, that is, typebound programming languages impose constraints on the objects' interaction, thereby preventing objects fiom an inconsistent intactionwith other objects. Cardelli and Wegnermetaphorically depict types as a set of clofher that protects an underlying uatypcd representation from arbior &tend-ed use. In other words, types provide aprofecfive coveringthat hides the underlying representation of the information, while constraining the way objects interact.
As explained in [15], a type system is an instrument that can be used for enforcing rules in the application domain and detecting their violations. The type system of a Programming langnage can be characterized as strong or weak, and the type checking mechanism as static or dynamic. Strong-typing is a strict enforcement of type rules because all types are defined and know at compile-time. Type checking ensures that the operands of an operator are of compatible types. A type check is static if it occurs before mu-time and remains unchanged throughout program execution, while it is dynamic if it occurs (or can change) during the execution ofthe program. A type error is the application of an operator to an opetand of an inappropriate type. A programming language is strongly typed if type mors are always detected. Hence, the most important advantage of strong-typing is that it allows the detection of the misuses of variables that result in type mors. Strong-typing catches more mors at compile time than weak-typing, resulting in fewer mu-time exceptions.
The real benefits of strong-typing have been often contested. We contribute to the dispute by presenting the experiences we gained with the design and implementation of RoboX--a tour guide-robot for the skiss Nafional Exhibifion Exp0.02. The analysis of the sofhvare failures encountered by the robot's system, let us argue that strong-typed programming languages and paradigms offer a valuable support for the production of reliable code.
The paper is structured as follows: Section n, briefly describes the har&real-time operating system X0/2, with its features and its support for the strong-typed programming language Oberon-2. XOIZ is the operating system chosen for the implementation of the robot's real-time requirements.
Section III presents the whole project:. The architecture of RoboX, its requirements and characteristics. Section IV dissects the mcture of the RoboX software development. Section V documents the results that have been collected during the whole period of activity. Aware of the difficulties in defming strict measurement m h c s , we compare and evaluate the numerical outcomes in Section VI. Section W wraps up our experience, with some considerations on the features of strong-typed propmming languages vs. the weak-typd ones.
n. x0/2 -REAL-TIME OPERATING SYSTEM XO/Z is an object-oriented, hard-real time system software and framework, designed for safety, extensibility and abstraction [6]. It is written in, and designed for the object-oriented language Oberon-2 [19]. It takes care of many common issues faced by programmers of mechatronic products, by hiding general design patterns inside internal mechanisms or by encapsulating them into easy-to-understand abstractions. Careful handling of the safety aspects has been the criterion by which the system has been crafted. These mechanisms, pervasive yet efficient, allow the system to maintain a dew ex-machina knowledge about the running applications, thus providing higher confidence to the application programmer. Th 
III. ROBOX PROJECT
Robotics was a very successful project presented at Erp a . 0 2 4 h e Swiss National Exhibiti0n.h Neuch&tel. Its goal was to convey the feeling of increasing closeness between human and machine. Visitors were able to interact with up to eleven autonomous, freely navigating tour guide robots.
Both the typical highly dynamic environment of an exhibit, and the high expectations anticipated by the visitors, imposed various constraints on the robot's design and control. This led to the mobile platform to be specified as follows.
The navigation shall perform with full autonomy and with a high degree of reliability in an environment designed around human beings, crowded with visitors and without the help of any artificial landmarks for the localition.
-Safety shall be treated as a prime concern for humans, furniture and the robots. The robot is composed of a navigation base and an interaction turret The control system was designed by keeping in mind that the safety of both humans and the robot have to always be guaranteed and it is composed of a CompactPC1 rack containing two processor boards sporting, respectively, an Intel Pentium Ill and a Motorola PowerPC 750. The latter is connected by the PCI hackplane to an analogldigital YO card, a Bt848-based frame grabber, an IndustryPack encoder module and an IndustryPack high bandwidth US422 interface. Furthermore a Microchip PIC processor is used as a redundant security for the system.
The navigation software is deployed on top of the harkealtime operating system XO/Z [6] running on the PowerPC. This processor has direa access to the camera looking at the ceiling, the two SICK LMS laser range tinders, the tactile plates and the main drive motors. It communicates with the interaction PC thmugh Ethernet via an ou-board hub. . _
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The interaction software runs on top of Windows ZOO0 on the embedded PC. This allowed integrating commercial off-theshelf (COTS) software for speech synthesis and recognition, while making scenario development easier. The PC has direct access to the eye camera, the pan-tilt eyes and eyebrows controller, the input buttons, the two loudspeakers and the ~~C I Ophone. Both CPUs are connected via radio Ethemet (IEEE 802.11) to an external computer for supervision purposes, such as the monitoring of its stati on a graphical interface, which serves as a data aggregator.
N. ROBOX SOFTWARE
The robot embeds both an Intel Pentium (PC) and a Motorola PowerPC (PPC) system. The software has been designed by taking into account the features and characteristics offered by the two embedded systems. Having being designed for complex real-time mechatronic applications, XOR was the nahual choice for controlling the low-level hardware and the time-critical tasks. Contrastingly, the functionality requiring the COTS components has been implemented on the Windows machine because of their wider availability (e.g. M r o l a for speech synthesis, small FireWire cameras in the robot's eye, vision libraries, etc.).
The design ofthe software that operates on each ofthe eleven robots was started at the end of year 2000. Even if the specification of the functionality was very hard due to the lack of references for a project of this kind, two milestones were defined at the beginning: Navigation and interaction. For the navigation the team could rely on the research of the Autonomous Systems Lab, EPFL, while for the interaction little experience was readily available. However, after various attempts, the basic functionality for the interaction was laid down and encompassed the navigation, the speech synthesis, the eye movements, the face tracking, the feedback buttons, people detection, speech recognitiou and the LED matrix.
The development of two prototypes started January 2001; The software development began April 2001. The team was composed ofthree special interest groups (SIC%): Robot prototyping and integration (three persons), navigation (five persons) and interaction (six persons). The navigation and interaction SICS were responsible for the software implementation under supervision of a computer scientist. The navigation team was led by an electronics engineer and comprised two computer scientists and two microengineers (one of each was a student). The interaction team was led by an electronics engineer and incorporated four microengiaeer.
The code developed by the Robotics team checks out at 1376 KB of compiled dynamically-lied executable for the navigation and 1703 KB for the interaction. The effort can be quantified in five' man-years for the navigation part and six manyears for the interaction part. I.Some code reuse-roughly ch-king out at two m a n -y k should be taken into account for the navigation software. It is the result of prior research of the Autonomous Systems Lab, EPFL.
Both teams shared a wealth of similar issues, namely bardware design, proprietary periphery devices, control-loop software, low-level drivers, software in-the-large, mathematics models, algorithmics and man-machine interaction. It has to be noted that the navigation portion of the software is the only one that can be deemed critical to persons and the environment, thus adding to its complexity.
V. RESULTS
The whole 159 days of operation-from May I4* to October 20*, 2002-are available for statistics. Every day and during the whole opening time (900 AM to 9:00 PM), six to eleven ikely navigating tour-guide robots have given tours on the a p proximately 320 mz surface ofthe exhibit. At the end ofthe exhibit, the robots served more than 680'000 visitors for a total of 13'313 hours of run-time. In order to perform the task, they travelled 3'316km for a total moving time of more than 9'415 hours. This yields a mean displacement speed of n 098 m /~. The wealth of information recorded by the system monitors allowed us to study the behavior of the robots, to understand their operational-time and, most notably, to recognize the reasons for the failures.
On the one hand, we deem a failure non-critical, when an exceptional condition cannot hinder the robot in performing its current task. For instance, it is not considered a critical failure if the robot stops sending images streamed over HTTP to the supervision computer.
On the other hand, we deem a failure critical, when an excep tional condition forces the robot to intermpt its activities and wait upon human intervention. The abtupt failure ofthe scenario controller or mishap during obstacle avoidance can be considered examples of critical failures. A particular class of critical failures can be identified in those failms requiring a resfart of either the Pentium or the PowerPC system. They are explicitly handled by our taxonomy, as they require more time before the robot can return to its n o d operational state.
From table 2 it can be seen that the non-critical failures represent only a small portion of the total amount of failures (6.7%). Since they do not substantially reduce the capabilities of the robat, they are not considered in our analysis, which will focus on the failures deemed critical or requiring a reboot.
The mean time between failure @TlBF) of the whole robot (F'C, PowerPC and hardware) was, during the first three weeks, 1.41 hours. Subsequently, the MTBF has been 4.02 hours.
The decreasing failure rate depicted in figure2, can be tracked down to the rapid improvement of the software quality on the PC, which tookplace as swn as the robot was deployed under real-world conditions.
Another interesting chart is depicted in figure 3 , where all the critical failures coming tiom the navigation software (Power-PC system) are displayed During the first three weeks, errors in the safety-critical tasks were treated by the security controller, and could sometimes require a reboot in order to restart the trapped task. This has been partly addressed in order to avoid rebooting, thereby allowing a much faster handling of the ex- Figure 3 reports failures ofthe localization system--IosffXures'-, which also require manual intervention, but are not directly related to the quality of the software. They cause 504 errors and thus represent the 73% of all of the critical failures on the PowerPC system. These failures, while being very interesting from a robotics point of view, are negligible for our analysis of the software quality.
The MTBF for the PowerPC system has been measured to lie between 10 and 80 hours. By taking into account the sofhvare errors only-and not the lost situations-the MTBF over the wbole period checks out at 70.1 hours.
By comparing figure 2 and figure 3, we can derive that the amount of mors manifested by the interaction software (3'216 failures) is one order of magnitode larger than those from the navigation software (190 failures, without taking into account the 504 lost situations).
While the navigation software could he considered more ready for prime time-due to the partial reuse of code, checking out at approximately 200 hours cumulated run-time for some navigation modules-the difference becomes negligible as the first three weeks of operation already yielded 1'686 hours of cumulated --time.
It may be interesting to analyze the particular issues experienced by the three major components, i.e. the PowerPC system, the Pentium system and the robot hardware.
The typical failures encountered on the PowerPC can be summarized as follows:
* Navigation: In some cases, the robots were unable to determine their location and thus notified a losf situation.
Obstacle Avoidance: The process deadline was missed, Since X0/2 is a hard-real-time operation system, the missing of a deadline is a potentially dangerous situation, thus the process is stopped and an exception is thrown. 
VI. DISCUSSION
By looking at the classes of ermn listed above, the following aspects are easily brought to attention: On the one hand, the errors exhibited by the two different platforms do not share anything in common; On the other band, the frequency of error conditions on the embedded PowerPC platform is an order of magnitude smaller than that of the Pentium system. T h i s difference may be related to several different reasons: In fact, the complexity of the tasks to be programmed for the two systems, the specific characteristics of the systems themselves and the programming experience of the single engineers could all have contributed to make one system more reliable than the other. Nonetheless, it would be interesting to understand which differences played a major role in this particular case, in order to infer generally valid rules for future projects. We started by evaluating the software quality. This fmt step requmd us to fmd a metric, which would be able to identify and quantify the peculiarities of the code driving RoboX.
This question is not new in the field of computer science. The assertion that the lines-of<ode metrics offers a rough measnre of code and does not measure its content at all, fostered computer scientists to devise new models for defming such characteristics. The following paragraphs serve as a short survey of their work.
In the seventies, researchers such as Boehm [2], Barbacci et al. [I] , Deutscb and Willis [9], Evans and Marciniak [IO] tried to establish a hierarchical relationship among a set of quality measures. They took into account categories such as performunce-i.e. how well programs fimction-muinfenunce-i.e. how easily programs can be corrected--uduptutio~i.e. how easily programs can evolve or migra-d user sutisfntion-i.e. how well programs meet the users' requirements. A drawback of this approach is that a red quantitative aspect of the measurements is still missing.
Other researchers tried to measure the program's complexity d m t l y gathered from &e source code. In doing this, they stressed computational complexity. As defmed by Halstead in [ 121, the complexity is extracted h m the amount of operators and operands in the program. However, the Halstead measure did not receive unanimous acceptance: The critics ranged from "unreliable *' (Jones [ 141) to "one of the most vulid meusurer of muinfoinubifiify " (Oman [ZO] ). The Halstead measurement metrics are based on four scalar numbers derived directly from a program's source code, namely the amount of distinct operators (",), the amount of distinct operands (+). the total number of operators (N, ) and the total number of operands (Nz ). From these numbers, five measures are derived, namely the program length (N = N, +N2 ), the program vocabulary (n = n, +a), the volume (N = N(log2n)), the difficulty (D = (n,12)(N,/n,)),andtheeffort(E = DY).
These measures are quite simple to calculate once the rules for identifying operators and operands have been determined. But as Szulewski noted in [22], establishing these rules could be quite a difficult task. The Halstead measures have been criticized for several reasons, among them is the claim that they are a weak estimate for they measure a lexical and textual complexity rather than a structural and logic flow complexity.
To overcome such a limitation other proposals were considered. A relevant one is the cyclomuric compferiify. Intrcduced by Thomas McCabe in 1976 [18] , it measures the number of linearly-independent paths through a program. This measure provides a single ordinal number that can be compared to the complexity of other programs. As one of the more widely-accepted software metrics, it is intended to be language independent. On the one hand, as presented in [26], cyclomatic complexity describes a methodology for software testing and related software complexity analysis techniques. On the other band, it bas also been extended to encompass the design and smctural complexity of a system, as described in [17] .
7he cyclomatic complexity of a program is calculated from a connected graph of the code, which represents the topology of the control flow. The complexity number is the sum of the number of edges in the graph with the number of connected components, subtracted by the number of nodes in the graph. In order to be able to actually wei these elements, McCabe established a counting convention . The complexity number is generally considered to provide a stronger measure of a program's structural complexity than the one provided by counting lines of code.
A large n u m h of programs have been measured and ranges of complexity have been established The resulting calibrated measure can be used in development, maintenance and re-engineering situations to develop estimates of risk, cost, or program stability. A low cyclomatic complexity contributes to a program's understandability, wbile studies show a correlation between a program's cyclomatic complexity and its error frequency.
It has become common practice to combine measures to fit the specific program environment. Thus, many measurcs are to some degree complementary. Oman in [ZI] presents a very comprehensive list of code metrics that are found in maintainability analysis, and orders them by degree of influence on the software-complexity measures and integrates them into a common hework-relies in the questionable variables that eventually make their way into the models. Therefore, instead of relying on some metrics, which would get polluted anyway by subjective intelpretation or ad-hoc weighting, we decided to rely on our "qualitative" perception of the problem space.
The problem spaces addressed by the two systems show a similar degree of complexity. Where the PowerPC system extracts precise geometry features of the environment thmugh laser scanning, the Pentium system gains cursory perception of the surroundings, by means of a video camera. Similarly, where the PowerPC system moves through a f h t e state machine for its jobs' handling, the Windows box follows an automata for implementing the man-machine i n t a t i o n . As a side effect, the complexity of the implementation of the two subsystems can be considered roughly similar. This stems from the fact that both parts need to process the environments through geometry models, while handling unexpected situations during their run-time. Incidentally, a superficial code-review reveals a similar number of lines-of-codes, roughly the same amount of basic-blocks and a comparable complexity of their execution-paths. Both systems present a hefty share of mathematical computations.
As a last remark, it can he noticed that the two sub-systems have been programmed by two separate teams of engineers, who were similarly qualified for the task Their background and experienceas mentioned in Section N-an be considered comparable, their profile can be qualified as high-level.
By taking into account the slightly larger amount of &-reuse, we were expecting the PowerPC to perform more reliably than the Pentium systen-by a factor of 2. Surprisingly, we were confronted with a system, which was lbtimes more reliable than the other, thus surpassing our most optimistic expectations. While not disputing the differences between the two tasks, we argue that they alone m o t be deemed responsible for such a difference in their respective run-time reliability. Therefore, other clues have to be found elsewhere.
The single noteworthy distinction that differentiates the two platforms can be found in the way they address safety with respect to memory. Whereas the PowerPC code was created by using a strong-typed programming language and it was run on top of an operating system that provides a plethora ofrun-time mechanisms aimed at enforcing safety and semantic correctness-such as a automatic memory reclamation and run-time typing informatiowotbing similar can be found on the Pentium system, whose code was prognunmed in the looselytyped C+ programming language and was nm on top of an operating system that does a poor job of enforcing memory safet y 4 s i d e s running applications in separate address spaces.
We strongly believe that the advantages of a strong-typed programming language and safety-enforcing run-time system cao be measured in a genuine improvement of the code quality and a real improvement of its dependability: Programs are more reliable, because several errors are already caught at compile-time, while the run-time system enforces type and memory safety during the execution.
We appreciate that this argumentation has some weaknesses: We found ourselves in the impossible situation to formally prove this theory, as all of the studies on code quality metrics serve only the task of showing bow difficult is to fmd a universal taxonomy, an all-encompassing h e w o r k that satisfies every requirement, covers each aspect and evaluates all.
Ilowever, empincal evidence shows that there Is a difference in the systems' reliability, and this discrepancy cannot be cntirely due to the diversity between the two platforms, for such a simplification would contradict several measurement metr i c~ Funhcrmore, a non-negligible clue towards the correct interpretation is given by the breed of mors observed on the Pentium system, which had mostly to do with memory faults, such as dangling pointers, out-of-range fetches and memory leaks.
vI1. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper. we considered the design and the deployment of a service robot as a practical appljcation domain to substantiate the advantages of using strong-typed progamming languages and paradigms in the development of snfety-cntical applicatlons. This application domain is particularly well-suited to the discussion, for mechauonic applications can be considered cntical system-i.e. systems whose falure may cndangcr missions, lives and society-thus making their reliability a prime concern. Our results reinforce the conviction that smng-typed programming languages and paradigms play a major role UI enforcing system safety.
The commonly used argument against languages that are typr-safe is the inefficiency of the produced code. This misconception can w i l y be refuted. In the case of static typc checking all resmctions are computed by the compiler: There is. therefore, no overhead in the code to be executed. Additionally, static typing allows for more aggressive utilization of optimuations such as rcachingdefmitions. and common subexpression elimination. W h a m each use of an aliased variable, as allowed in unsafe languages through pointer-arithmctic, forccs the optimizer to invalidate all of the assumptions previously taka. When static safety cannot be enforced dynamic checks arc needed. The added safety, brought by the Validation of the programming invariant at run-the, more than compensates the penalty paid in the execution time. In fact, there is no uade-off fur letting a type violation happen d u~g run-time.
The RoboX project represents a milestone in the field of mobile robotics: For th~. first time evm, eleven lnteractivc mobile robots wcreoperahng forarelative long period in a work-spacc shared by human beings. We analyzed the results of 159 days of opcration at the Robotics exhibition wilhm Expo.02 and considcrcd the amount and the n a m e of somVare and hardware failures. Notwithsonding the obvious differences between the two architectures dnnng the robot-i.e. a Motorola PowerPC and an Intel Pentium systems-and the difficulties in finding a comprehensive measurement meuics for code quality, the analogies in the code wmplexiry on both platforms and the similar know-how of the whole development team led us to the conclusion that the reason fur the I-10.16 error ratio between the PowerPC and the Pentium should he ascnhrd to the features offered by programming languages and run-time systems that support strongtyping Lachng a formal proof, a rationale may be found m the words of Prof. Niklaus Wmh, who summarired the advantages of strongtyping by advocatlng that '?he basic principle b e h d the concept of strong-typing relies in the introduction of redundancm, which verify the consistency of the code operating on the data-& tu pamy checking. This consistency check should be performed, when possible. at compile-time: That is the reason of the keyword strong".
